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Japan defaulted on its public debts only once throughout its modern history, after 
World War II (WWII). How did Japan lose its ability to sustain its public debts? This 
paper explores the sustainability of public debts in Japan before and during WWII.   
First, this paper reviews the brief history of pre-WWII public finance in Japan 
with reference to some narrative evidence, data, and previous works. 
Second, this paper conducts three stages of econometric analyses. It tests 
Ricardian neutrality of public debt. It tests the dynamic efficiency of Japanese economy, 
and it conducts Bohn’s tests for the relationship between public debt and primary fiscal 
balance. The tests indicate that Japanese public debts were sustainable until 1931, and 
unsustainable in and after 1932. 
Third, this paper interprets the results of quantitative analyses with narrative 
modes of analysis. During the 1930s, Japan lost its fiscal discipline because of the 
military’s effective veto over budgetary processes and because of the absence of pressure 
for sound fiscal policy from international financial markets. 
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1 I would like to thank Takero Doi, Eisaku Ide, Yoichi Matsubayashi, Ryuzo Miyao, 
Richard Smethurst, and participants in the Kinki Workshop of Socio-Economic History 
Society of Japan, the Rokko Forum and RIEB Seminar at Kobe University, and the 
Seminar at the Bank of Japan, for their helpful comments and discussions. Any 
remaining errors are my own. 1. Introduction 
Japan defaulted on its public debts only once throughout its modern history, 
after World War II (WWII). Japanese yen-denominated government debts became 
worthless during the rampant inflation between 1945 and 1948. How did Japan lose its 
ability to sustain its public debts? This paper explores the sustainability of public debts 
in Japan before and during WWII with quantitative and narrative analyses.   
First, this paper reviews the brief history of pre-WWII public finance in Japan 
with reference to some narrative evidence, data, and previous works. 
Second, this paper conducts three stages of quantitative analysis. It tests 
Ricardian neutrality of public debt for the pre-WWII Japan. The result indicates 
non-neutrality. Then, it tests the dynamic efficiency of the pre-WWII Japanese economy, 
and confirms it. These results indicate a need for another test for sustainability of 
public debt, one which is proposed by Bohn [1998]. 
Bohn’s method tests the relationship between public debt and primary fiscal 
balance. Bohn’s basic notion is that if a government improves its primary balance when 
it sees an increasing public-debt/output ratio, then its public debts are sustainable in 
the long-run. If not, public debts are not sustainable. 
This paper conducts Bohn’s tests with a new dataset of the Japanese primary 
fiscal balance from 1885 to 1943. The tests assuming structural changes within the 
sample period indicate that Japanese public debts were sustainable until 1931, and 
unsustainable in and after 1932. 
Third, this paper interprets the results of quantitative analysis with narrative 
modes of analysis. In doing so, it explores the governance of fiscal policy both from the 
domestic and the international sides. It compares the policy responses during two 
periods in which Japanese government faced financial difficulties, namely after the 
Russo-Japanese War (1904-05) and in the early 1930s. The narrative modes of analysis 
indicate that Japan lost its fiscal discipline during early 1930s because of the military’s 
effective veto over budgetary processes and because of the absence of pressure for sound 
fiscal policy from international financial markets. 
Section 2 reviews Japanese public finance before WWII. Section 3 conducts a 
quantitative analysis. Section 4 interprets the results in section 3 with a narrative 
analysis. Section 5 contains some conclusions. 
 
2. Japanese public finance before WWII 
a. Some Narrative Evidence 
Narrative evidence indicates several turning points in modern Japanese public 
 1finance. First, Japan had established stable modern public finance with reforms before 
the middle of 1880s. Second, the Russo-Japanese War in 1904-05 imposed a heavy 
burden on its public finance. Third, rapid economic growth during WWI (1914-18) 
reinforced Japanese public finance. And fourth, debt-financed fiscal stimulus policy 
during the Great Depression of the early 1930s marked a drastic change in Japanese 
public finance. 
Japan had established stable modern public finance before the middle of 1880s. 
After the Meiji Restoration in 1868, the government conducted drastic fiscal reforms 
during the 1870s. The reforms include Chiso Kaisei, the reform of land tax, Chitsuroku 
Shobun, the repeal of stipends for ex-samurai, and the disposal of debts inherited from 
feudal governments.2 Around the time of the Civil War in 1877, the fiscal balance 
deteriorated and the monetization of the fiscal deficit caused inflation. In the 1880s, 
Masayoshi Matsukata, the prominent Finance Minister, conducted a tight fiscal policy 
to restore the fiscal balance, a policy which is often referred to as ‘Matsukata’s 
deflationary policy.’ Under the leadership of Matsukata, Japan introduced the silver 
standard in 1885, and moved into the gold standard in 1897. 3
The Russo-Japanese War, the first modern total war for Japan, imposed a 
heavy burden on Japanese public finance. Japan financed the war by borrowing from 
Western investors through London and other international markets. After the war, the 
government faced financial difficulty because the investors had doubts about the 
government’s capability to repay the debt.   
Rapid economic growth during WWI reinforced Japanese public finance. 
Growth in nominal terms reduced the burden of previous debts. Japan also accumulated 
a trade surplus and specie during WWI. Japan used these national assets to deal with 
bad loan problems and other fiscal demands during 1920s. Meanwhile, Japan 
suspended gold convertibility in 1917 following the Western countries and resumed it in 
1930. 
The gold embargo in the end of 1931 and the following debt-financed fiscal 
stimulus policy marked a drastic change in Japanese public finance. A veteran Finance 
Minister Korekiyo Takahashi initiated the policies.4 The Japanese economy recovered 
                                                  
2 Nakamura [1971], Oomori [2001]. 
3 Matsukata became Finance Minister in 1881 for the first time, served four times as 
Finance Minister until 1900 and twice as Prime Minister. During his career in public 
service, he played the central role in building up a modern financial system including 
the Bank of Japan and the gold standard. 
4 Korekiyo Takahashi (1854-1936) joined the Bank of Japan (BOJ) in 1892 and served 
as Governor of the Bank from 1911 to 1913. He then served as Finance Minister seven 
times from 1913-36, and as Prime Minister once, from 1921-22. He was assassinated by 
 2faster than other economies in the midst of the Great Depression. Many observers 
appraise Takahashi as a pioneer of the Keynesian counter-cyclical macroeconomic 
policy (Nakamura [1971]).   
Some observers blame Takahashi’s strategy for losing fiscal discipline and for 
paving the way to rampant inflation after WWII because he initiated debt-financed 
public spending. Ministry of Finance [1965] argues that his strategy resulted in the 
accumulation of deficit-covering bonds and inflation.5 Some blame Takahashi’s scheme 
of the underwriting of government bonds by the Bank of Japan (BOJ). They say that the 
scheme became an instrument of easy credit to the government by the central bank. 
Shima [1983] says that “such easy instruments tend to be abused and to become 
common practice.”6  
Some observers defend Takahashi. Nakamura [1971] emphasizes that 
Takahashi tried to cut government spending including military expenditures when the 
recovery became robust, and that Takahashi’s trial was cut short when he was 
assassinated by a group of militarist in 1936. They blame Takahashi’s successor, Eiichi 
Baba, for failing to control military expenditures. Fiscal deficits exploded during Baba’s 
term. 
When and how the sustainability of Japanese public debts was lost, is an 
empirical question. We will explore the question combining quantitative and narrative 
modes of analyses. 
 
b. Data on Public Finance 
Figure 1 shows public-debts for fiscal 1885-1943.7 This sample of 58 years 
includes almost all periods from the establishment of modern Japanese public finance 
system to the collapse of the system. The solid line indicates the long-term (over 1 year) 
national debt. We take figures from the statistics of the Ministry of Finance (MOF).   
                                                                                                                                                  
a group of militarists on February 26, 1936. During his career in public service, he 
played the central role in fundraising in the Western countries during the 
Russo-Japanese War. He solved a major financial crisis in Japan in 1927, and he 
conducted a drastic economic stimulus package during the Great Depression. 
Smethurst [2007]. 
5 Ministry of Finance [1965], pp.129-142. 
6 Shima [1983], p.119. 
7 All figures are expressed in ratio to output (gross national products) and fiscal year 
basis unless otherwise indicated. The output data are taken from Long-term Economic 
Statistics (LTES). 
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Sources:  The Financial History of Meiji-Taisho Era, 11: National Debts; Reference Book of 
Financial Matters; LTES. 
 
The average of long-term national debt over the sample period is 42 percent of 
GNP, while the ratio shows some swings. It is stable under 30 percent until the 
outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War in 1904. It soars during the war up to 65 percent in 
the end of 1906. It remains at around 60 percent until the outbreak of WWI. It falls 
during WWI to 21 percent in the end of 1919. It creeps up during the 1920s to 42 
percent, the average level of the whole sample period, at the end of 1930. It jumps 
during the first half of Takahashi’s term of 1932-36 and stays at the 50-60 percent level 
for the rest of his term. It skyrockets after 1936. 
Figure 2 shows fiscal-balances for fiscal 1885-1943. The solid line indicates the 
primary balance, which is total revenue less payments not including interest payments.   
Previously available data of fiscal balances in the General Account is 
misleading because it does not include special accounts. Among others, the biggest 
problems are related to war expenditures and debt consolidation. The government set 
Special Accounts for Temporary War Expenditures four times with the Sino-Japanese 
War in 1894-95 (the fiscal year for the account: June 1894-March 1896), the 
Russo-Japanese War (October 1903-March 1907), WWI (August 1914-April 1925), and 
the Asia-Pacific War/WWII (September 1937-February 1946).8 These War Expenditures 
                                                  
8 On July 7, 1937, Japan and China embarked upon an undeclared war. In this study, 
we use the term “Asia-pacific War” to describe warfare in 1937-45 because Japanese 
 4make big impacts on the overall fiscal balance without impacting the General Account. 
The government established a Special Account for Government Debt Consolidation 
Fund in 1906. The government often stopped or reduced the amount of transfers from 
the General Account to the fund when it faced financial difficulties. 
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Sources:  The Financial History of Meiji-Taisho Era, 11: National Debts, Ministry of 
Finance Yearbook, LTES. 
 
In this study, we have new estimates of fiscal balances. We calculate the 
overall fiscal balance by subtracting the previous year’s long-term national debt from 
the present year’s. Then we calculate the primary fiscal balance by adding the present 
year’s interest payments for the whole national debt to the overall fiscal balance. In 
doing so, we count all government revenues and expenditures, including special 
accounts. One disadvantage of this approach is that we cannot breakdown the 
developments in fiscal balances into revenues and expenditures. 
We see two troughs in the fiscal balance, namely during the Russo-Japanese 
War and the Asia-Pacific War. During the Russo-Japanese War in 1904-05, the 
primary-deficit/output ratio records double digit figures. In 1905, the deficit was 26 
percent of GNP. The scale of deficit per year is equivalent to 1942. These two wars 
induced a heavy burden on Japanese public finance. The difference between these two 
wars is the length of the trough. The trough in the Russo-Japanese War is short, and 
the trough in the Asia-Pacific War is long. The Sino-Japanese War (1894-95) and WWI 
                                                                                                                                                  
public finance maintained continuity through this period. 
 5(1914-18) were not heavy burdens for Japanese public finance. Takahashi’s term in the 
1930s also marks deficits while the scale is small compared to the two big wars. 
We may interpret the relationship between public debt in Figure 1 and fiscal 
balances in Figure 2 as a dynamic process. The two factors of determinants of public 
debts are accumulated fiscal balances as numerator and nominal output growth as 
denominator. Public debts increase when the government accumulates fiscal deficits. 
This was the case during the Russo-Japanese War, Takahashi’s term, and the 
Asia-Pacific War. Public debt decreases when the output increases more than fiscal 
deficit in nominal terms. This was the case during WWI. 
 
Table 1. Revenues and Expenditures in the General and War Accounts 
        (as percent of GNP)  
           
   Revenues  Expenditures Military  Others  Events 
1885-93    8.7   6.1   2.3   3.9    
1894-95    6.4   10.8   8.3   2.5   Sino-Japanese  War 
1896-1903    9.3   9.4   4.7   4.6    
1904-06    12.2   22.9   18.8   4.1   Russo-Japanese  War 
1907-13    13.3   10.3   4.7   5.6    
1914-18    10.3   8.1   4.6   3.6   WWI 
1919-21    8.7   9.0   5.7   3.3    
1922-31    9.5   9.0   3.2   5.7   Disarmament 
1932-36    8.7   10.8   5.4   5.4   Takahashi’s term as FM 
1931    10.2   9.4   3.4   6.0    
1932    9.5   12.1   5.0   7.2    
1933    9.4   12.2   5.4   6.8    
1934    8.3   10.4   5.5   4.9    
1935    8.1   9.9   5.6   4.3    
1936    8.5   9.5   5.4   4.1    
1937    9.4   18.3   13.8   4.5    
1937-41    10.9   26.1   20.9   5.3    
           
1885-1941    9.9   11.1   6.5   4.7    
Notes. 
1. Revenues exclude debt issues and borrowings, surplus from the previous year, and 
surplus of Temporary War Expenditure Accounts. 
  2. Expenditures exclude debt servicing costs. 
Sources MOF  [1955],  Ministry of Finance Yearbook. 
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Table 1 shows fiscal revenues and expenditures for fiscal 1885-1941. We take 
the revenues from the General Account. We take the expenditures from the General and 
war expenditure accounts. The military expenditures include war expenditures in the 
Special Accounts for Temporary War Expenditures, the expenditures of the Army and 
Navy in the General Account, and expenditures for mobilization in the General Account. 
Although the figures in Table 1 are not consistent with Figure 2, we have an 
approximation of the revenue/expenditure breakdown of fiscal balances, correcting 
some problems of previously available data. 
Table 1 confirms that the finance of military spending dominates in public 
finance in pre-WWII Japan. The military expenditures during the Russo-Japanese War 
and during the Asia-Pacific War reach 20 percent of GNP while the average over the 
sample period is 6 percent.   
The government intended to finance the Russo-Japanese War mainly by 
raising taxes and by issuing debt rather than cutting expenditures. The revenues, most 
of which were taxes, rose from 9 percent of GNP before the war to 12 percent during the 
war. The revenues further rose to 13 percent after the war while military expenditure 
and the sum of other expenditures were higher than the pre-war level in 1906-08. The 
government did not curb expenditures within the pre-war level until 1909. 
Disarmament efforts such as the Washington Conference in 1921-22 
distributed peace dividends to Japan. The military expenditure decreased to an average 
of 3 percent of GNP in 1922-31. The government used the peace dividends for public 
investments (Nakamura [1971], p.147) and bad-loan disposal (Itoh [1989], p.197). The 
sum of other expenditures than military spending reached a record high of 6 percent of 
GNP. 
The deterioration in fiscal balances during and after Takahashi’s term in 
1932-36 was mainly due to increase in military spending. Military expenditure soared 
to 6 percent of GNP during 1932-36, and jumped to 14 percent in 1937. Other 
expenditure increased to 7 percent in 1932-33, but fell below 5 percent afterwards. 
 
3. Econometric Analysis for Sustainability of Public Debt 
a. Methodology 
How we should define sustainability of public debt? Hamilton and Flavin 
[1986] define this sustainability as that in which the “government budget must be 
balanced in present-value terms.”9 Bohn [2005] argues that present-value criteria is 
                                                  
9 Hamilton and Flavin [1986], pp.811-812. 
 7based on the assumptions of infinitely-lived optimizing behavior of potential lenders 
and complete financial markets, which guarantee a common pricing kernel for interest 
rates. And, Bohn generalizes the conditions for sustainability as those in which “an 
agent’s ability to borrow is constrained by other agents’ willingness to lend.”10 Bohn 
[1998, 2005] derives a simple rule or a government’s reaction function for sustainable 
public debt by solving intertemporal optimization equations of private agents. 
Doi and Nakazato [2004] present a three-stage method for testing 
sustainability of public debt. Figure 3 presents a flow chart of their method. They 
propose testing the debt neutrality hypothesis first, to test the dynamic efficiency of the 
economy second, and to test the Bohn’s criteria third. They test the sustainability of 
post-WWII Japanese public debt with the method. They conclude that the post-WWII 
Japanese public debt was sustainable until the beginning of 1990s, and that the debt 
was not sustainable from the middle of 1990s.11
This study applies the three-stage method for analyzing sustainability of public 
debt presented by Doi and Nakazato [2004] on pre-WWII Japan. 
 
Figure 3. Methodology for Testing Sustainability of Public Debt 
 
No  Yes 
















Source: Doi and Nakazato [2004]. 
 
b. Debt Neutrality 
Debt neutrality hypothesis, also referred to as Ricardian equivalence theorem, 
states that the domestic private agents recognize public debts held by the domestic 
                                                  
10 Bohn [2005], p.15. 
11 There is only one previous study employing quantitative analysis on the 
sustainability of public debt in pre-WWII Japan. Asako et al. [1993] test if the amount 
of public debt diverges or not, and if the government’s revenue and expenditure 
cointegrate or not. They employ the tests for the sample periods of 1885-1944 and 
1885-1936. They conclude that pre-WWII Japanese public debt was not sustainable. But, 
they do not indicate when the public debt became unsustainable. 
 8agents as future tax obligations and not as net wealth.12 If this hypothesis holds, a 
government does not have to prepare for future repayments of the public debts held by 
domestic private agents. In this case, the public debt is sustainable regardless of the 
government’s behavior. 
An important prerequisite for debt neutrality hypothesis does not hold for 
pre-WWII Japan. If the public debt is held by foreign investors, the debt is not neutral. 
Foreign investors held a substantial part of Japanese public debt. Figure 4 shows the 
ratio of foreign holdings of the public debt. Foreign investors held more than 50 percent 
of the debt after the Russo-Japanese War until WWI. They held about 30 percent in 
1920s and over 10 percent during the first half of 1930s. 









1885 1890 1895 1900 1905 1910 1915 1920 1925 1930 1935 1940
percent of total debt
 
Note:  Total of national and local debts. 
Source: 
 
Fujino and Teranishi [2000], Nihon Kin'yu no Suryo Bunseki (Quantitative Analysis of 
Japanese Finance). 
 
Previous empirical works indicate that the debt neutrality hypothesis does not 
hold in many cases even when held by domestic agents. Bernheim [1987] reviews 
previous studies on the U.S. and Canada, and concludes that public debts in these 
countries are not neutral. Honma [1996] and Ihori et al. [2001] test the hypothesis on 
post-WWII Japan, and conclude that the hypothesis does not hold. 
Bernheim [1987] theoretically interprets the above empirical evidence, arguing 
                                                  
12 Barro [1974]. 
 9that the hypothesis presumes strict conditions.13 The conditions are “that (1) successive 
generations are linked by altruistically motivated transfers; (2) capital markets either 
are perfect, or fail in specific ways; (3) the postponement of taxes does not redistribute 
resources within generations; (4) taxes are nondistortionary; (5) the use of deficits 
cannot create value (that is, through ‘bubbles’); (6) consumers are rational and 
farsighted; and (7) the availability of deficit financing as a fiscal instrument does not 
alter the political process.” Shibata [1991] reviews these conditions and concludes that 
the debt neutrality does not hold when heterogeneous agents exist and when wealth is 
redistributed among them in some way. 
We assume that the debt neutrality hypothesis does not hold in pre-WWII 
Japan because an important prerequisite does not hold and because previous empirical 
and theoretical works indicate difficulties in meeting conditions for the hypothesis.   
 
c. Dynamic Efficiency 
Abel et al. [1989] state that an economy is dynamically inefficient when the 
economy is consistently investing more than it is earning in profit.14 If an economy is 
dynamically inefficient, borrowers do not have to repay their debts in the 
macroeconomic sense. In such an economy, the government, typically the biggest 
borrower, is allowed to run continuous deficits. 
Abel et al. [1989] present a method to test the dynamic efficiency of an economy 
by comparing cash flows going into and coming out of an economy’s production sector. 
They argue that conventional models comparing growth rate and interest rate are 
inadequate in a stochastic setting with uncertainty in profitability, the value of capital, 
and growth rate. They argue that the net cash flow criterion, which they present, is an 
adequate way to test dynamic efficiency in a stochastic setting.15
This study applies the net cash flow criterion presented by Abel et al. [1989] to 
pre-WWII Japan. We estimate gross profit and gross investment from existing data, and 
compare them. Figure 5 shows them in terms of output-ratio. Gross profit exceeds gross 
investment for the whole period of 1885-1940, indicating that Japanese economy has 
been dynamically efficient. The average difference of gross profit and investment for 
1885-1940 was 18.8 percent of GNP.16  
We assume dynamic efficiency of the Japanese economy with a large margin of 
                                                  
13 Bernheim [1987], pp.264-265.   
14 Abel et al. [1989], p.1. 
15 Abel et al. [1989], p.2. 
16 Abel et al. [1989] reported post-WWII Japanese data, and the difference in 1960 was 
17.6 percent, roughly equivalent to the pre-WWII level. 
 10difference between gross profit and investment. 
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Sources:  LTES; Ohkawa and Minami eds. [1975], Kindai Nihon no Keizai Hatten (Economic 
Developments of Modern Japan); 
  Emi and Shionoya eds.[1973], Nihon Keizai Ron (Japanese Economy). 
 
d. Bohn’s Tests 
The analyses above indicate a need for another test for sustainability of public 
debt, one which is proposed by Bohn [1998].   
Bohn’s method tests the relationship between public debt and primary fiscal 
balance. Bohn’s basic notion is that if a government improves its primary balance when 
it sees an increasing public-debt-to-output ratio, then its public debts are sustainable in 
the long-run. If not, public debts are not sustainable. He also notes that the positive 
relationship between primary balance and debts is not necessary for the sustainability 
of public debts when the debt-to-output ratio is low.   
Bohn’s method is becoming a standard for testing sustainability of public debts. 
Bohn [1998] applies the formula to the United States for 1916-95, and shows that the 
nation’s public debt was sustainable over that period. Bohn [2005] extends the test to 
the U.S. for the period of 1792-2003, and shows that its public debt was sustainable for 
more than 200 years. Ihori et al. [2001] apply the method to Japanese national debt for 
1956-98. They show that the Japanese national debt was not sustainable in recent years. 
Doi and Nakazato [2004] extend the test to Japanese public debts including local 
governments for the period of 1956-2000. They show Japanese public debt was 
sustainable until the beginning of 1990s, and became unsustainable from the middle of 
 111990s. Ghatak and Sanchez-Fung [2006] apply the method to test the debt 
sustainability of developing economies, including Peru, the Philippines, South Africa, 
Thailand, and Venezuela, for the period of 1970-2000. 
We apply Bohn’s method to pre-WWII Japan with the new dataset of Japanese 
primary fiscal balance, which has been presented in Section 2.b. The formula is 
expressed by equation (1). 
(1)  , 1 0 t t Y t G t t YV GV d s ε α α ρ α + + ⋅ + ⋅ + = −
t s denotes primary fiscal surplus at time t,  denotes public debt at the end of time t-1, 
denotes temporary fiscal spending, and  denotes cyclical variables. We have 
presented  and  in Figure 2 and Figure 1, respectively. We take national debt as 
public debt because of data constraints in local governments’ debts and because of 
similarity in movements of data between national debt and total debts including local 
governments’ debts. We take , temporary fiscal spending, from direct military 
spending by MOF estimates.
1 − t d
t GV t YV
t s 1 − t d
t GV
17 The definition of the MOF estimates is close to 
temporary parts of military spending in Barro [1986] and Bohn [1998] in a sense that 
MOF, Barro, and Bohn intend to separate big swings in military spending from other 
fiscal spending. We derive , a cyclical variable, by taking a deviation from the trend 
value in real output (GNP) in logarithm.
t YV
18 All variables other than  are normalized 




The sign and the statistical significance ofρ , the coefficient of , is critical 
for our purpose. Table 2 shows the regression results. We employ the ordinary 
least-square method (OLS) in (a1) and (b1) regressions. We employ the two-stage 
least-square method (2-SLS) with one-period lagged explanatory variables as 
instrument variables in (a2) and (b2) regressions. We use long-term debt as the public 
debt in (a1) and (a2) regressions. We use total debt including short-term debts such as 
treasury bills as the public debt in (b1) and (b2) regressions. Different regressions yield 
qualitatively the same results. 
1 − t d
ρ  has positive signs as expected in all regressions. 
ρ is statistically significant by 5 percent level in 2-SLS regressions while ρ is not 





                                                  
17 Ministry of Finance [1955], pp.4-5. 
18 The trend value is calculated by HP filter (λ=100) for 1885-1943. 
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Table 2. Estimation Results (Bohn's Test)         
dependent variable: primary fiscal surplus             
sample period: 1886-1943                 




     
d: long-term debt  a1)        a2)         
α0  2.647  ( 3.48  ) ***  2.101  ( 2.51  ) ** 
ρ   0.031  ( 1.41  )   0.061  ( 2.39  ) ** 
αG   -0.874  (  -18.66 ) ***  -0.962 (  -16.13  )  ***
αY  -12.51  ( -1.18  )   -9.856  ( -0.58  )  
adj. R2   0.904       0.897       
DW    1.87         1.75       
                  
d: total debt  b1)        b2)         
α0  2.816  ( 3.45  ) ***  1.835  ( 1.98  ) * 
ρ   0.023  ( 1.04  )   0.066  ( 2.44  ) ** 
αG   -0.865  (  -17.96 ) ***  -0.975 (  -15.47  )  ***
αY  -13.514  ( -1.25  )   -8.733  ( -0.50  )  
adj. R2   0.908       0.892       
DW    1.89         1.75       
t t Y t G t t YV GV d s ε α α ρ α + + ⋅ + ⋅ + = −1 0
 
Notes.  1. Figures in parentheses are t-values. * represents 10 percent significance, ** represents 5 percent 
significance, and *** represents 1 percent significance. 
 
2. Estimated by the ordinary least-square method (OLS) in (a1) and (b1) regressions. Estimated by 
the two-stage least-square method (2LS) with one-period lagged explanatory and dependent 
variables as instrument variables in (a2) and (b2) regressions. 
 
e. Bohn’s Tests with Structural Changes 
  Narrative evidence suggests a structural change or changes in the 
government’s behavior in terms of fiscal policy and debt management within the sample 
period. Japanese public debt became unsustainable at some point in time and ended 
with rampant inflation after WWII. Candidates for events incurring such structural 
changes are the Russo-Japanese War, WWI, and Takahashi’s debt-financed spending 
policy. 
We employ Bohn’s method with a structural change to explore the timing and 
 13properties of the structural change. First, we employ the stepwise Chow tests to find the 
timing of the structural change. Second, we employ Bohn’s tests with dummy variables 
to explore the properties of the structural change. Third, we estimate recursive 
t-statistics for the coefficientρ to explore within-sample developments ofρ . 
The Chow test is to check if the OLS regression with dummy on constant and 
coefficient of all explanatory variables is better in terms of explanatory power than the 
corresponding regression without dummy. A better explanatory power of the regression 
with dummy indicates the existence of a structural change. The stepwise Chow tests 
explore if a structural change exists within the sample period, and when, if at all, the 
structural change occurs, by moving the starting period of dummy. 
The result of the stepwise Chow tests on equation (1) indicates a structural 
change at the 5 percent significance level either in or around 1906, 1917, or 1932 
(Figure 6). The result is consistent with narrative evidence. The timings of possible 
structural changes indicated by the stepwise Chow tests coincided with the events 
which had a big influence on the Japanese public debt. 1906 is the first year after the 
Russo-Japanese War. 1917 is the midst of the rapid economic growth during WWI. 1932 
is the first year of Takahashi’s debt-financed fiscal policy. 
Figure 6.Stepwise Chow Test












Table 3 shows descriptive statistics of explanatory variables of equation (1) for 
the full-sample period and for sub-sample periods derived from the stepwise Chow tests. 
In 1885-1905, the public debt and the primary deficit are lower than the full-sample 
 14average, indicating a stable fiscal position. In 1906-16, the public debt is higher than 
average while the primary surplus is recorded, indicating a remarkably tight fiscal 
policy for repaying wartime debts. In 1917-1931, the public debt and the primary deficit 
are lower than average, indicating a stable fiscal position. During this period, the 
temporary spending is the lowest among sub-sample periods, indicating the effects of 
disarmament. In 1932-43, the public debt, the primary deficit, and the temporary 
spending are the highest among sub-sample periods, indicating deterioration in fiscal 
position. 
 
Table 3. Descriptive Statistics               
                        
Sample period    1885-1905  1906-16  1917-31    1932-43      1885-1943
Number of obs.  21      11  15      12      59 
Long-term debt    24.541        55.739 31.474      70.477        41.463 
  (  8.992   )  ( 9.053   ) ( 6.715  ) ( 24.581   )  (  22.579  )
Total debt    28.083        58.622 33.032      73.034        44.178 
  (  10.747   )  ( 8.913   ) ( 6.571  ) ( 24.837   )  (  22.775  )
Primary surplus    -1.546        1.023   -0.111      -12.101        -2.849 
  (  6.431   )  ( 3.818   ) ( 1.209  ) ( 10.107   )  (  7.721   )
Temp. expenditure    5.742        5.338   3.848      17.894       7.656  
  (  5.964   )  ( 2.076   ) ( 1.085  ) ( 13.970   )  (  8.837   )
Note. Figures are average as percent of GNP. Figures in parentheses are standard deviations. 
 
The formula of Bohn’s tests with dummy variables is expressed by equation (2). 
(2)  , ) ( ) ( ) ( 0 1 1 0 0 t t G t G t t t D GV GV D d d D s ε α α ρ ρ α α τ π τ π τ π + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + = − −
τ D has a value of zero before period τ and a value of one in and after period τ. We run 
regressions for three cases of τ=1906, 1917, and 1932. We excluded , cyclical 
variables, from the regressions because  is insignificant for all regressions above 
and because we want to have as many degrees of freedom as possible. 
t YV
t YV
Table 4 shows the regression results.  π ρ , the coefficient of dummy for public 
debt is significant in all regressions, implying a structural change at the timing 






Table 4. Estimation Results with Dummy Variables: Case 1(Bohn's Test) 
                          
dependent variable: primary fiscal surplus              
sample period: 1886-1943                    





d: long-term debt                           
  Dummy1906    Dummy1917  Dummy1932  No  Dummy   
α0 10.870  (  3.75   )  ***  3.675   (  4.38  ) *** 2.842 ( 3.16  ) ***  2.408 ( 3.28  ) ***
απ -9.576   (  -3.05   )  ***  -        -      -       
ρ0 -0.290   (  -2.32   )  **  0.043   (  2.14  ) ** 0.049 ( 2.26  ) ** 0.038 ( 1.86  ) * 
ρπ 0.347   (  2.70   )  ***  -0.092  (  -3.71  ) *** -0.098  ( -3.48  ) ***  -       
t t G t G t t t D GV GV D d d D s ε α α ρ ρ α α τ π τ π τ π + ⋅ ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + = − − ) ( ) ( ) ( 0 1 1 0 0
0 G α   -1.002   (  -11.69  )  ***  -1.030  (  -13.29  ) *** -0.985 ( -12.57 ) *** -0.884 (  -19.16 ) ***
π αG   0.120   (  1.16   )    0.343   (  2.99 ) *** 0.327  ( 2.76 ) ***  -       
adj. R2 0.916          0.921         0.919      0.904     
DW  1.74          2.15        2.08      1.78      
 
Notes 1.  Dτ takes value of zero before period τ, and value of one in and after period τ. 
2.  Estimated by OLS. Figures in parentheses are t-values. * represents 10 percent significance, ** 
represents 5 percent significance, and *** represents 1 percent significance. 
 
In the case of τ=1906,  0 ρ = -0.29, and π ρ =0.35, implying that the coefficient 
of changed from -0.29 to 0.06=-0.29+0.35 in 1906, the result implies the government 
changed its attitude to public debt and moved towards a tighter direction, improving the 
sustainability of public debt. Table 3 reports that the level of public debt is low before 
1906 and high afterwards. The regression result is consistent with narrative evidence of 
tightening fiscal policy in the wake of ballooning public debt during and right after 
Russo-Japanese War. 
1 − t d
In the case of τ=1917,  0 ρ = 0.04, and π ρ =-0.09, implying that the coefficient 
of changed from 0.04 to -0.05=0.04-0.09 in 1917, the result implies the government 
changed its attitude to public debt and became slacker, worsening the sustainability of 
public debt. 
1 − t d
In the case of τ=1932,  0 ρ = 0.05, and π ρ =-0.10, implying that the coefficient 
of changed from 0.05 to -0.05=0.05-0.10 in 1932, the result also implies government 
changed the attitude to public debt to easier direction, worsening the sustainability of 
1 − t d
 16public debt. 
In which year, 1917 or 1932, did the sustainability of public debt deteriorate 
more? In other words, which structural change is more significant? To answer this 
question, we run the regression below. 
(3)  ) ( 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 0 0 τ π τ π ρ ρ ρ α D d D d d s t t t t ⋅ ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅ + ⋅ + = − − −
  , ) ( 2 2 1 1 0 t t G t G t G D GV D GV GV ε α α α τ π τ π + ⋅ ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ +
1 τ D has a value of one in 1917-31 and a value of zero otherwise.  has a value of one 
in 1932-43 and a value of one otherwise. The sample period is 1906-43. We take the 
period of 1906-16 as the baseline in which period the government conducted a sound 
fiscal policy to make public debt sustainable. And we compare the divergence of fiscal 
policies in 1917-31 and 1932-43 from the baseline period of 1906-16. 
2 τ D
 
Table 5. Estimation Results with Dummy Variables: Case 2 (Bohn's Test) 
         
dependent variable: primary fiscal surplus   
sample period: 1906-1943     
Number of observations: 38     
estimation formula:           
         
         
d: long-term debt         
         
α0 2.146   (  0.66   )    
ρ0 0.072   (  1.14   )    
ρπ1 -0.056   (  -1.03   )    
ρπ2 -0.105   (  -2.33   ) **   
t t G t G t G t t t t D GV D GV GV D d D d d s ε α α α ρ ρ ρ α τ π τ π τ π τ π + ⋅ ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅ + + ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ + = − − − ) ( ) ( 2 2 1 1 0 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 0 0
0 G α   -0.995   (  -3.07   ) ***   
1 π αG   0.290   (  0.52   )    
2 π αG   0.318   (  0.91   )    
adj. R2 0.937          
DW 1.94          
 
Notes 1.  Dτ1 takes value of one in 1918-31, and value of zero otherwise. 
  Dτ2 takes value of zero in and before 1931, and value of one in and after 1932. 
2.  Estimated by OLS. Figures in parentheses are t-values. ** represents 5 percent 
significance, and *** represents 1 percent significance. 
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The regression result shows that the structural change in 1932 is more robust 
than in 1917 and that the Japanese public debt become unsustainable in around 1932 
(Table 5).  2 π ρ , the coefficient of the dummy for 1932-43 is statistically significant, 
while 1 π ρ , one for 1917-31 is not. The absolute value of 2 π ρ is greater than 1 π ρ . The 
central estimate of the coefficient of is 0.07 for the period of 1906-16, 0.02 for 1917-31, 
and -0.03 for 1932-43, implying that the coefficient changes from positive to negative in 
1932.  
1 − t d
Ghatak and Sanchez-Fung [2006] employ the recursive t-statistics approach to 
explore within-sample developments of the debt sustainability of the post-WWII 
developing economies. Bohn’s method tests if the sign of coefficient of public debt is 
significantly positive or not. They fix the starting period and test Bohn’s method, 
extending the ending period year by year from late 1970s to 2000. They report changes 
in signs and absolute values of t-statistics for the coefficient of public debt in different 
sample periods. 
We fix the starting period in 1886 and run the regression for equation (1), 
extending the ending period year by year from 1918 to 1943.   










The regression results suggest that Japanese fiscal policy become less sound 
during Takahashi’s term of 1932-36 (Figure 7). The inclusion of data from the 1920s and 
1931 makes ρ statistically more significant. The inclusion of data of 1932-36 
makesρ statistically less significant.  ρ is statistically different to zero by a 10 percent 
significance level for the sample period of 1886-1926 through 1886-1932. ρ is not 
 18statistically different to zero by a 10 percent significance level for the sample period of 
1886-1933 through 1886-1943. 
 
f. A Review of Quantitative Analysis 
The Bohn’s tests assuming a structural change within the sample period 
indicate that Japanese public debts were sustainable until 1931, and unsustainable in 
and after 1932. 
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Sources:  See footnotes of Figure 1 and 2. 
 
We review the results of Bohn’s tests with a scatter diagram of public debt in 
the horizontal axis and primary fiscal balance in the vertical axis (Figure 8). The bottom 
line of Bohn’s argument is that an upward-sloping relationship between these two 
variables indicates sustainability of the public debt. A government manipulates 
primary fiscal balance, seeing the level of public debt in the end of previous fiscal year. 
The rule of thumb for sustainable public debt is that if the government sees an increase 
in public debt, it tightens the budget. If it sees a decrease in public debt, it loosens the 
budget. The results of quantitative analysis indicate that Japanese public debt and 
primary fiscal balance kept an upward-sloping relationship until 1931, and moved into 
a downward-sloping relationship from 1932. We see a small reversal in 1934-36 toward 
an upward-sloping, but the reversal is not statistically significant. 
The quantitative analysis above supports the view that Japan lost its 
 19sustainability of public debt in the first half of 1930s, or in the beginning of Takahashi’s 
term. This is consistent with views presented by the Ministry of Finance [1965] and 
Shima [1983]. 
Why did Japan’s public debt become unsustainable in the first half of the 
1930s? The quantitative analysis above says very little about it. We should not conclude 
that Takahashi’s strategy of debt-financed fiscal spending resulted in “accumulation of 
deficit-covering bonds and inflation” only with the quantitative analysis. Narrative 
modes of analysis shed light on this question. 
 
4. Narrative Analysis of Developments in Fiscal Policy 
We explore the developments which drove Japanese public debt unsustainable 
in the first half of 1930s. We focus on the governance of fiscal policy, both from domestic 
and international sides. From the domestic side, we focus on the coordination problem 
of political institutions under the Meiji Constitution. From the international side, we 
focus on the fiscal discipline associated with the international financial markets under 
the gold standard system. We explore the cases after the Russo-Japanese War, during 
the 1920s, and on the eve of Takahashi’s debt-financed fiscal spending policy. And, we 
explore the logic and the reality of Takahashi’s debt-financed spending policy. We 
review previous works and look at new archives to employ the case study. 
 
a. The Political Institutions under the Meiji Constitution 
The conduct of fiscal policy is different from other macroeconomic policy, i.e. 
monetary policy, from the viewpoint of political economy. Historically, fiscal policy has 
not been decided by a single entity, e.g. MOF and/or the Cabinet, which is primarily 
responsible for public finance. Fiscal policy has been decided by negotiations on budget 
among various political players, including MOF, the Cabinet, political parties, and 
other various interested groups. In contrast, monetary authority has been concentrated 
in a small group, either in the central bank and/or in MOF even if pressures from 
outsiders are harsh. The crucial element of monetary policy is the relationship with the 
participants in the financial markets in a broad sense. 
The political institutions under the Meiji Constitution of 1889 conditioned the 
budgetary process of pre-WWII Japan. The Cabinet had a very limited capacity to 
coordinate political players. Under the Meiji Constitution, various entities with 
authorities were directly linked to the Emperor. Such authorized entities include the 
House of Lords, the House of Representatives and political parties, bureaucrats, the 
 20Privy Council, Army, Navy, and the Cabinet.19 The Cabinet had to make any decision 
by unanimity. If a single member of the Cabinet, e.g. Army Minister or Navy Minister, 
disagreed with other members, the Cabinet had to resign. The Senators, who were 
appointed by the Emperor as informal advisers with no provision in the Constitution, 
acted as the behind-the-curtain coordinators from time to time. But, the Senators’ 
capacity for policy coordination was also limited.20
The Army and Navy had an effective veto in the budgetary process. The Army 
and Navy served under the supreme command of the Emperor, and had the authority to 
decide the long-term national defense plan and day-to-day military operations 
independent of the Cabinet. A Prime Minister was allowed to look at the national 
defense plan only after ratification by the Emperor. The Cabinet and MOF devoted their 
efforts to negotiations with the Army and Navy in the annual budgetary process. 
Sometimes they reached compromises with the military. Sometimes they failed to do so, 
and the Cabinet resigned. 
 
b. The Case after the Russo-Japanese War: Maintaining Sustainability (1) 
We explore the political economy of the sustainability of Japanese public debt 
after the Russo-Japanese War. Participation in the international financial markets 
under the gold standard worked as a governance mechanism for keeping the 
sustainability of Japanese public debt while coordination problems under the Meiji 
constitution put the sustainability in question. 
Joining the gold standard was a choice of policy regime. Under the gold 
standard regime, a country enjoyed easy access to international financial markets when 
it needed to borrow large amounts of money, for example, during wartime. In return, 
the government sacrificed the needs of the domestic economy in order to maintain an 
external balance and gold parity in ordinary times. Sound fiscal policy was prerequisite 
for joining the gold standard. In this regard, Bordo and Rockoff [1996] argue that 
adherence to the rules of the gold standard signaled prudent fiscal and monetary 
policies of the country, and provided improved access to capital from the core Western 
countries. 
The late 19th and early 20th centuries were the heyday of the international gold 
standard. Japan adhered to the principles of sound fiscal policy even before joining the 
                                                  
19 Nakamura [1993], pp.10-13; Muramatsu and Ito [2001], p.82. 
20 Emperor Mutsuhito the Great, on the throne in 1867-1912, appointed nine Senators 
during his reign. His successors appointed no one. As a standard practice, the Emperor 
appointed a Prime Minister in accordance with the Senators’ advice. Nakamura [1993], 
pp.12-13. 
 21gold standard, and joined the gold standard in 1897. Before joining it, there was a great 
deal of opposition from the business community, which argued that staying on silver 
would make Japanese products more competitive in the international markets than 
moving into gold. The then Prime Minister and Finance Minister Matsukata went 
ahead with joining the gold standard.   
Adherence to the Gold Standard enabled Japan to finance the Russo-Japanese 
War by borrowing money in Europe and North America. The war expenditure amounted 
to 1,826 million yen or 187 million pound, 60 percent of Japanese GNP in 1904. Japan 
issued bonds of 1,045 million yen or 107 million pound (in face value) in London and 
other overseas markets in 1904-05 to finance the war. Eiichi Shibusawa, a 
distinguished business leader and a principal opponent against the gold standard before 
joining it, later said, “I realized several years later (of joining the gold standard) that it 
was crucial for Japan. And, I sincerely admired Lord Matsukata for rejecting my 
opinion.”21
Participating in the international financial markets was consistent with other 
national goals. Japan intended to expand in Asia in cooperation with the 
Anglo-American alliance.22 Foreign Minister Jutaro Komura asked for the support of 
the British and American governments when the war with Russia became inevitable. 
He emphasized that the purpose of war was to liberate Manchuria from Russia, and 
that the war met the national interests of Britain and the United States. Komura asked 
President Theodore Roosevelt to mediate for peace. Korekiyo Takahashi, then Vice 
Governor of BOJ, cooperated with the British and American financial leaders to sell 
Japanese public bonds to the Western investors. 
The sustainability of Japanese public debt was put into question after the 
Russo-Japanese War. Both international and domestic investors were worried about the 
country risk of Japanese government bonds. They were concerned with the burdens of 
Japan’s wartime debt and increasing fiscal spending for promoting Japanese strategic 
and economic interests in China and Korea. Prices of Japanese government bonds 
(JGBs) in secondary markets dropped and new issues of JGBs suffered from a slump in 
sales.23
Japan restored the credibility of its bonds by tightening its fiscal policy. The 
                                                  
21 “Speech at the Dinner of 20th Anniversary of the Gold Standard in Japan,” November 
1, 1917, reprinted in BOJ [1958], p.703. 
22 Metzler [2006] and Smethurst [2007] provide extensive narrative evidence that 
Japanese political leaders recognized the importance of cooperation with 
Anglo-American alliance and pursued it. 
23 Kamiyama [2000], p.48. 
 22Japanese policymakers, including the military, agreed to limit government spending 
within the range of maintaining gold parity. The first Saionji Cabinet (1906-08) 
committed to reduce new bond issues in 1906 with the request of Takahashi, who was 
negotiating with Western financial leaders on the refinancing of war bonds.24 The 
second Katsura Cabinet (1908-11) announced the principle of a balanced budget in 1908. 
These two Cabinets increased taxes and postponed military and other spending.25 And, 
the prices of JGBs recovered in 1908.26
Political players, including the military, reached a consensus on tight fiscal 
policy because they recognized the importance of the credibility of public debt for 
achieving national goals. In the early stages of negotiation, MOF pursued a balanced 
budget while the military insisted strengthening their potential for promoting Japanese 
strategic interests. The Army insisted on an increase of divisions, and the Navy insisted 
on an increase in fleet size. A Senator, Kaoru Inoue, insisted on tighter fiscal policy to 
restore the credibility of Japanese bonds. 27 Kinmochi Saionji and Taro Katsura 
persuaded the military and reduced their budget requests.28
The case after the Russo-Japanese War indicates a kind of governance 
mechanism worked through the international financial markets under the gold 
standard. Japan’s case during this period is a perfect example of Bordo and Rockoff’s 
argument. The Japanese government proved their commitment to the gold standard. 
And they were rewarded by the cheaper cost of fundraising in the international 
markets. 
 
c. The Case during 1920s: Maintaining Sustainability (2) 
The participation in the international financial markets worked as a 
governance mechanism for keeping the sustainability of Japanese public debt even 
when Japan had suspended the gold standard during 1920s. 
Japan suspended the gold standard in September 1917, following the Western 
countries, and tried to return to the gold standard in the 1920s. Incidents such as the 
Great Kanto Earthquake in September 1923 and the Financial Panics in the spring of 
1927 hindered the government’s final decision. Japan finally returned to the gold 
standard in January 1930. 
                                                  
24 Kamiyama [2000], pp.42-43. 
25 The principle of the second Katsura Cabinet is called hibosai-shugi, literally “the 
principle of no new bond issue.” Kamiyama [2000], p.56. 
26 Kamiyama [2000], p.57. 
27 Kamiyama [2000], pp.54-55. 
28 Masumi [1988], pp.140-172. 
 23When Japan was off gold, Japan once issued foreign bonds in February 1924 in 
London and New York, with expensive servicing costs. The yield was 7 percent.29 The 
purpose of the issue was to refinance a part of the Russo-Japanese War bonds due on 
1926 and to finance the earthquake reconstruction. People called the bonds “the bonds 
of national disgrace” because the terms were against Japan.30
The Hamaguchi Cabinet (1929-31) committed to returning to the gold standard 
and to disarmament. Tight fiscal policy was consistent with these goals. Prime Minister 
Hamaguchi declared that, “We will take decisive actions for fiscal austerity of the 
central and local governments. We will restrict the budget of the Army and Navy to an 
extent that will not to affect national defense. By doing so, we will promote business 
restructuring and thrift to the people.”31 Japan returned to the gold standard in 
January 1930, and concluded the London Naval Treaty in April. Japan ratified the 
treaty in October though hardliners in the Navy were opposed to the ratification. In 
November, MOF and the Navy reached agreements on budgetary treatment on this 
issue. 
Hamaguchi gained political support from the public and from the Senator 
Kinmochi Saionji.32 Hamaguchi dissolved the House of Representatives in January 21, 
1930, the opening day of the London Naval Conference and one week after returning to 
the gold standard. The Ruling Minsei-To Party overwhelmingly won the general 
election. Senator Saionji publicly supported Hamaguchi’s policy of cooperation with the 
United States and Britain.33
Eigo Fukai was a distinguished economist, served as Vice Governor of 
BOJ(1928-35) and Governor (1935-37), and became one of primary policy advisers to 
Korekiyo Takahashi during Takahashi’s term in 1932-36. Fukai argued thus for the 
political economy of macroeconomic policy in favor of the gold standard in his book in 
1928: 
“It is generally difficult to establish adequate standards for monetary 
control. And even if established, it is difficult to maintain them. The gold 
standard defines a currency to be exchanged with a certain amount of gold. This 
constraint set the extent and the direction of monetary control naturally though 
                                                  
29 The coupon for Sterling bonds was 6 percent and the issue price was 87.5 pounds for 
the face value of 100 pounds. The coupon for dollar bonds was 6.5 percent and issue 
price was 92.5 dollars for the face value of 100 dollars. MOF [1940], p.450. 
30 Nakamura [1993], p.75. 
31 “Statement by Prime Minister Osachi Hamaguchi,” Government Gazette, July 10, 
1929, reprinted in BOJ [1968], p.394. 
32 In the late 1920s and early 1930s, Saionji was the only Senator alive. 
33 Masumi [1988b], p.10. 
 24not automatically. Even if the discretion of policymakers is defective, the 
adverse effects will not go too far under the gold standard.   
Recently, policymakers need the consent of the public in order to conduct 
monetary policy. From the perspective of immediate benefits, an abundant 
money supply may be the best bet both for fiscal and macroeconomic policy 
objectives; nonetheless, the money supply needs to be properly controlled to 
avoid future setbacks. It is, however, difficult to persuade the public simply by 
explaining monetary theories or standards for monetary control. The 
explanation that money should not be issued excessively because it must be 
backed by a certain amount of gold would immediately convince the public. With 
the restrictions under the gold standard, policymakers could keep sound and 
secure money.”34
 
Returning to the gold standard paid off in a sense even though the domestic 
economy fell into depression. Japan issued foreign bonds in May 1930 in London and 
New York with the yield of 6.2 percent, a substantial reduction in servicing costs 
compared to the 1924 issues. Again, the purpose of the issue was to refinance a part of 
the Russo-Japanese War bonds due in January 1931. Juichi Tsushima, Vice Minister of 
Finance for International Affairs, later told about the importance of returning to the 
gold standard for issuing bonds in the international markets. He said, “Before returning 
to the gold standard, bankers in Britain and the United States insisted with one voice 
that issuing bonds in the international markets was difficult with the unstable 
exchange rate of the yen. They insisted that Japan should stabilize the currency first, 
and issue bonds in the international markets next.”35 Itoh [1989] argues that the 
Hamaguchi Cabinet hurried to return to the gold standard partly because they needed 
to refinance the war bond before its redemption.36
The case during the 1920s indicates the enduring governance mechanism 
through the international financial markets under the gold standard. The Japanese 
government restored the commitment to the gold standard, and was paid off with 
cheaper cost of fundraising in the international markets. 
 
d. The Turning Point: Losing Sustainability, September 1931 
Two events in September 1931 were critical for the governance of Japanese 
                                                  
34 Fukai [1928], pp.302-303. 
35 Tsushima [1965], p.65. 
36 Itoh [1989], p.213. 
 25fiscal policy. The first is the Mukden Incident, or Manchuria Incident, which began on 
September 18. Another one is the British departure from the gold standard on 
September 21. The Mukden Incident heightened the domestic coordination problems 
among political players under the Meiji Constitution, and the British departure from 
the gold standard eroded the governance mechanism through the international 
financial markets. 
The Japanese government lost the ability to govern military spending during 
the Mukden Incident. The Kwantung Army37 escalated the operation without the 
consent of Tokyo. The commander of the Unit of the Imperial Japanese Army in Korea 
sent his troops to Manchuria without permission. Although the government originally 
said that it would not expand the military operation, the military undermined this by 
extending operations. The government later confirmed that it would pay the costs for 
sending troops from Korea. Heightened military tensions with China provoked tensions 
with the United States, and the military demanded a larger budget for dealing with 
these tensions. 
The British departure from the gold standard eroded the rationale for staying 
on the gold standard. For peripheral countries, including Japan, sound fiscal policy and 
adherence to the gold standard did not ensure easy access to the international financial 
markets any more. Fukai later wrote in his memoirs, “In retrospect, it would have been 
sensible for Japan to have departed from the gold standard immediately because the 
British departure was a change in the global situation.” BOJ first tried to suppress 
capital outflows to support the gold standard, raising the official discount rate twice in 
October and in November. Market participants anticipated that Japan would follow 
Britain as with other countries row, inducing massive capital outflows. Japan departed 
from the gold standard on December 13, 1931, under the leadership of Korekiyo 
Takahashi, who returned to the position of Finance Minister on the day. 
Two events in September 1931, the Mukden Incident and the British departure 
from the gold standard, indicate that the governance mechanism for sustainable public 
debt was already lost when Takahashi returned as Finance Minister in December of the 
year. 
 
e. The Logic and the Reality of Takahashi’s Debt-Financed Spending Policy 
We explore the logic and reality of Takahashi’s debt-financed spending policy 
                                                  
37 The Kwantung Army was a unit of the Japanese Imperial Army based in Kwantung 
Peninsula, northern China. 
 26with his addresses at the Diet and other archive materials.38
Takahashi emphasized the temporary nature of the increasing fiscal deficit 
and justified the increased public debt with the logic of intertemporal tax smoothing. He 
said, “We will finance the whole fiscal gap in 1933 with debt. This is because primary 
factors of increase in expenditures are temporary, too large to finance with increase in 
taxes and other revenues, and because increase in taxes and other revenues would 
break the budding economic recovery. This is not yet the right time for tax increase.”39
Takahashi mentioned that if public debt becomes unsustainable, the symptoms 
appear in the financial markets. He said, “How should we measure the limit of public 
debt? If a government tries to issue more bonds and print more money than that the 
private sector is able to manage, bad inflation would follow. The other possibility is that 
people would not credit the currency. In this case, symptoms would appear in the 
exchange rates.”40  
Takahashi was worried about depreciation in the exchange rates rather than 
inflation. He said, “How much has the government had BOJ underwrite public debt? It 
is about 1.7 or 1.8 billion yen. Now, BOJ only holds 0.2 billion yen. This indicates that 
bad inflation is remote at this time. I am worried about [the depreciation of] the 
exchange rates, which would hurt the public reputation of the Japanese currency.”41
Eigo Fukai, then the Vice Governor of BOJ and one of the primary policy 
advisers to Takahashi, handed a short memo to Takahashi on the sustainability of 
public debt in September 1934.42 It is likely that Takahashi consulted Fukai about 
public-debt management, and that Takahashi’s talks in the Diet in the beginning of 
1935 were based on the opinion of Fukai. The logic of Takahashi’s talks in the Diet was 
almost the same as Fukai’s memo. Presumably, Fukai explained monetary theories and 
their application to debt management to Takahashi by the memo. 
Fukai regarded the policy instruments of the underwritings of government 
                                                  
38 Among others, Ide [2006] provides extensive narrative evidence on this issue.   
39 “Speech by Finance Minister on Debt Management in Fiscal 1933 Budget, An 
Explanatory Session, General Meeting of House of Representative, 64th Assembly, 
January 21, 1933,” reprinted in MOF [1954], p.575. 
40 “Rejoinder by Finance Minister to the Question by Gotaro Ogawa, Budget Committee, 
House of Representative, 67th Assembly, Janurary 31, 1935,” reprinted in MOF [1954], 
p.583. 
41 Ibid. p.583. 
42 A copy of the memo, “An Opinion of the Vice Governor on the Capacity of Government 
Bond Issue,” is included in “Documents on Capacity of Government Bond Issue, 
January 1933-August 1935,” BOJ Archive No. 1895. The document is written on 
business stationery of Research Department of BOJ. On the top of the document, a note 
says, “This is copied by staff personally.” 
 27bonds and the selling operations of these bonds by BOJ as convenient facilities for 
extending the capacity of the government to finance debt. Fukai wrote, “Public issues of 
government bonds induce a tightening of financial markets. If BOJ underwrites 
government bonds, fiscal spending precedes the selling operations of BOJ, inducing an 
easing of the money markets and a decrease in interest rates.” He continued, “The limit 
of public debt under the facilities [underwritings of government bonds and the selling 
operations of these bonds by BOJ] depends on how far we can continue these kinds of 
operations.” 
Fukai concluded the memo by emphasizing two dangers for the sustainability 
of public debt. He emphasized the dangers of suspicion about future repayment of the 
public debt by market participants and of anticipation about the declining value of the 
currency by them. Fukai wrote, “The most alarming thing would be incapacity of 
government bond issue either from suspicion about future repayment of the public debt 
or from anticipation about declining value of the currency. If this happens, it would 
cause problems in fiscal policy, and at the same time, it would have disturbing 
consequences on economic and social institutions. If people anticipate the declining 
value of the currency, interest rates will soar. The incapacity of government bond issue 
is the result of the anticipation, and at the same time, it foments the anticipation. That 
is a vicious circle. One would say that I am worrying over nothing because we see no 
such symptoms up to now. But, we should watch out for the danger because if we once 
get into a vicious circle, we will be swept away too fast to deal with it. Though our policy 
objective [the management of public debt] is a part of the national strategies for 
supreme national goals, we should look at it in the most prudent manner in terms of 
fiscal, monetary and exchange rate policies. I dare to mention exchange rate policy 
because anticipation of the declining value of the currency often appears in the 
exchange rate markets.” 
Fukai intuitively understood Bohn’s notion that “an agent’s ability to borrow is 
constrained by other agents’ willingness to lend.” Fukai argued that symptoms 
appeared in the financial markets as soaring interest rates on government bonds and/or 
falling exchange rates when investors had doubts about the sustainability of public debt. 
He insisted on policies avoiding these situations in the financial markets. Fukai learned 
from the experience of hyperinflation in Central Europe after WWI.43
MOF tried to reduce fiscal deficit under Takahashi’s leadership. They 
negotiated with the military and other ministries about the postponement of 
                                                  
43 Fukai wrote a number of articles on the hyperinflation in Central Europe. Fukai 
[1929], pp.1-64, Fukai [1938], pp.317-325, Fukai [1941], pp.250-255. 
 28expenditures and transfers from special accounts to the General Account. They 
achieved some reduction in the amount of new issues of government bonds in fiscal 1936, 
but the reduction was far from enough. The negotiation increased tensions with the 
military, paving the way to the assassination of Takahashi on February 26, 1936 by a 
group of militarists. 
MOF also introduced regulations to prevent free falls of the exchange rates. 
The Foreign Exchange Control Law was proclaimed on March 1933 and came into effect 
on May. Under the law, the regulations on foreign exchange transactions were 
substantially extended and tightened. Almost all the transactions related to 
international capital flows were subject to regulation. At the same time, speculations on 
foreign exchange were forbidden by finance ministry ordinance. 
 
f. Sustainability of Public Debt: After the Russo-Japanese War and during the Early 
1930s 
In both periods, the sustainability of government debts was in question. The 
government accumulated foreign and domestic debts during the Russo-Japanese War, 
and the government faced new needs for fiscal expenditures after the War. In the early 
1930s, Japan departed from the gold standard, and initiated debt-financed fiscal 
spending in the midst of the Great Depression.   
On the domestic side, the political institutions under the system of the Meiji 
Constitution of 1889 made governance of fiscal policy difficult. This was the case both 
after the Russo-Japanese War and in the 1930s. The cabinet’s political power was 
limited when it came to coordination among various political entities. 
The political institutions gave the military an effective veto in the budgetary 
processes. The military had authority to create their own spending plan without 
consulting with other cabinet members or with the budgetary branch, and then to 
negotiate with the Ministry of Finance to finalize the annual budget. If the military 
disagreed with cuts in military spending, they could reject the budget at the cabinet 
meeting. 
On the international side, financial constraints under the international gold 
standard enforced fiscal discipline after the Russo-Japanese War. This mechanism 
lasted until the 1920s. This was not the case when the international gold standard was 
in trouble during the early 1930s.   
In the 1930s, the military did not agree to limit military spending within the 
limits necessary to maintain gold parity. The international gold standard was falling 
into chaos after the departure of Britain in September 1931. Japan could not expect 
 29easy access to the international financial markets, even if it adhered to the principles of 
the gold standard. Rather, the adherence to the gold standard worsened economic 
conditions. Japan departed from the gold standard in December 1931, following Britain, 
and initiated debt-financed fiscal spending. 
During the 1930s, Japan lost fiscal discipline because of the military’s effective 
veto over budgetary processes, and because of the absence of pressure for sound fiscal 
policy from international financial markets. The budgetary process during the 1930s 
failed to restrict fiscal expenditures. And no monitoring mechanism of Japanese public 
finance existed any more. 
When Japan was losing the ability to sustain its public debts, fiscal and 
monetary authorities introduced a new method for financing public debts, the 
underwriting of government bonds by the Bank of Japan. Though trying to prevent the 
collapse of the securities markets, they were only able to delay the collapse. And they 
were forced to depend on this method more and more in the absence of fiscal discipline. 
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
In this study, quantitative analysis shows that Japan lost the sustainability of 
its public debt in around 1932. Narrative analysis indicates that Japan lost its fiscal 
discipline because of the military’s effective veto over budgetary processes, and because 
of the absence of pressure for sound fiscal policy from international financial markets. 
The turning point was September 1931. 
In this study, we have explored some aspects of the governance of the fiscal 
policy of Japan by focusing on the domestic political institutions and the international 
financial markets. We need more research on related topics to draw complete pictures. 
Future topics include the impact of domestic socio-economic conditions such as 
depressions in rural areas, developments in financial markets which enabled 
debt-financed fiscal policy, and the impact of international geopolitical conditions such 
as growing tensions in Asia-Pacific region induced by Japanese expansion. 
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